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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
I

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

:

v.

t

JAMES ACE MOREHOUSE#

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 860193-CA

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The following issues are presented in this appeal.
1.

Was the evidence presented by the State at trial

sufficient to support the verdict?
2.

Was defendant denied his right to effective

assistance of counsel?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, James Ace florehouse, was charged with
aggravated arson, a second degree felony, under UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-6-103 (1978) (amended 1986) 1 (R. 18-19).

After a jury trial,

he was found guilty as charged (R. 94). The trial court
sentenced him to the Utah State Prison for a term of one to
fifteen years, and ordered him to pay restitution in an amount to
be determined by the Board of Pardons (R. 111).

1

The 1986 amendment to § 76-6-103 made aggravated arson a first
degree felony.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

At trial, the State presented the following evidence
that supported the verdict.
On November 1, 1985 at approximately 8:00 p.m., there
was a fire in the attic of a gas station leased and operated by
defendant in Salt Lake City.
extinguished the fire.

The fire department arrived and

Later that evening at approximately 11:00

p.m., a woman across the street from the station observed
defendant enter it through a hole in the bay door which had been
cut by firefighters earlier.

Shortly thereafter, she heard

breaking glass, saw flames coming out of the station's front
window, and observed defendant reemerge through the hole in the
door, walk to his car, enter it, and sit there until the fire
department arrived.

Testimony from a number of witnesses also

established that defendant could have been at the station during
the hour immediately prior to the 8:00 p.m. fire (R. 178-87, 44142 582-85) .
Two investigators with the Salt Lake City Fire
Department, who had expertise in arson investigation, concluded
that both fires at the station had been intentionally set by
igniting flammable liquids which had been poured at various
locations in the building.

They ruled out an electrical

malfunction as the cause (R. 319, 321, 567-71).
In the eight month period prior to the fires, defendant
bad experienced financial losses in the operation of the station
and had taken out an $8,000 loan because he was low on funds (R.
266-72, 287). And, several months prior to the incident,

-2-

defendant had complained to the owner of the station that the
rent was too high (R. 581). Finally, on November 4, 1985,
defendant filed an insurance claim for the fire damage, but
withdrew it the next day (R. 497-99).
Defendant presented numerous witnesses in his behalf,
including a fire expert, in an effort to establish his
whereabouts before the first fire, to demonstrate that the
State's expert witnesses had incorrectly concluded that the fires
had been intentionally set, and to suggest that either a person
seen exiting and reentering a car on the station premises at the
time of the second fire or another person observed there by a
neighbor was responsible for that fire (R. 615-933).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The State presented sufficient evidence at trial to
support the jury's finding that the fires at defendant's station
were intentionally caused by defendant.
Defendant does not demonstrate that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel at trial.

In arguing that

counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress evidence and to
recognize the application of Utah R. Evid. 609 to his client
constituted ineffective assistance, defendant fails to show
either that counsel's performance was deficient or that any
deficiency resulted in demonstrable prejudice.

-3-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STATE PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AT
TRIAL TO SUPPORT DEFENDANTS CONVICTION.
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly set out the
standards for appellate review of a challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence presented at trial:
This Court will not lightly overturn the
findings of a jury. We must view the
evidence properly presented at trial in the
light most favorable to the jury's verdict,
and will only interfere when the evidence is
so lacking and unsubstantial that a
reasonable man could not possibly have
reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.
We also view in a light most favorable to the
juryfs verdict those facts which can be
reasonably inferred from the evidence
presented to it.
State v. McCardell. 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1982) (citations
omitted).

As noted in State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985):
In reviewing the conviction, we do not
substitute our judgment for that of the jury.
"It is the exclusive function of the jury to
weigh the evidence and to determine the
credibility of the witnesses . . . . " Stale.
v- Lamm. Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (1980);
aO££l& State v. Linden, Utah 657 P.2d 1264,
1266 (1983). So long as there is some
evidence, including reasonable inferences,
from which findings of all the requisite
elements of the crime can reasonably be made,
our inquiry stops.

Id, at 345 (citations omitted).

And, even if the appellate court

views the evidence as less than wholly conclusive, or if
contradictory evidence or conflicting inferences exist, the
verdict should be upheld,
1982).

state v. Howell. 649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah

In short, "on conflicting evidence the Court is obliged

to accept the version of the facts which supports the verdict."
4-

S t a t e v . I s a a c s o n . 704 P.2d 5 5 5 , 556 (Utah 1985)
flSttSli,

649 P.2d a t

( c i t i n g S t a t e V,

93).

Defendants argue that the evidence presented by the
State at trial was insufficient to support a jury finding that
arson had occurred or, assuming that there was arson, that
defendant was the responsible party.
First, defendants claim that there was insufficient
evidence to prove arson ignores the opinion testimony of the
State's two expert witnesses —
(R. 319, 321, 567-71).

William Memmott and Gary Mclff

That Lt. Mauerman may have initially

concluded that the first fire was electrically caused does not
undercut the opinions given by Memmott and Mclff.

It was

Mauerman who called in the experts after the second fire because
that later fire appeared to have been caused by flammable
liquids; his investigation of the first fire clearly was not as
complete as that conducted by the experts (R. 216-217).

And,

that defendant's expert reached different conclusions is of no
consequence.

The jury had the prerogative to decide the weight

and credibility to be given the expert testimony.
Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 544 (Utah 1983).

State v.

Significantly, a similar

insufficiency argument was recently rejected by the Utah Supreme
Court in State v. Nickles. 728 P.2d 123, 125-26 (Utah 1986).
Although the evidence against defendant was primarily
circumstantial, it clearly connected him with the second fire
and, when viewed in light of the authority on review of a
sufficiency claim cited above and the Supreme Court's holding on
somewhat similar facts in Nickles, 728 P.2d at 126-27, was

5-

sufficient to support the jury's finding that defendant was
responsible for the arson.

Defendant's heavy reliance on State

v- Hill, 727 P.2d 221 (Utah 1986)f is misplaced, in that a
majority of the Court determined that the evidence was sufficient
to support the defendants' convictions in that case.

Hill. 727

P.2d at 223-25 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result) (Hall,
C.J., dissenting, with Howe, J., concurring in the dissenting
opinion of Hall, C.J.).

POINT II
DEFENDANT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HE WAS
DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT
TRIAL.
On appeal, defendant alleges that trial counsel's
performance was both deficient and prejudicial when counsel
failed to object to the admission of certain evidence purportedly
seized in violation of the fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution, and when he misunderstood the application of Utah
R. Evid. 609 in advising defendant not to testify at trial.
Defendant presented the second part of this argument to the trial
court in a motion for a new trial, but was denied relief (R. 12223, 1147).
In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel
justifying reversal of a conviction, "it is the defendant's
burden to show:

(1) that his counsel rendered a deficient

performance in some demonstrable manner, and (2) that the outcome
of the trial would probably have been different but for counsel's
error."

State v. Geary* 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1985).

summarized in State v. Frame. 723 P.2d 401 (Utah 1986)5
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As

In claiming ineffective counsel, defendant
has the burden to demonstrate that counsel's
representation falls below an objective
standard of reasonableness, godianna v.
ttajLLifir 660 P.2d 1101, 1109-09 (Utah 1983).
Defendant must prove that specifier
identified acts or omissions fall outside the
wide range of professionally competent
assistance. The claim may not be
speculative, but must be a demonstrative
reality, sufficient to overcome the strong
presumption that counsel rendered adequate
assistance and exercised "reasonable
professional judgment." Strickland v.

Washington* 466 u.s. 668, 104 s.ct. 2052,
2066, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); ^tate v. Lairbv.
699 P.2d 1187, 1204 (Utah 1984). And, an
unfavorable result does not compel a
conclusion of ineffective assistance of
counsel. State V. Buehl* 700 P.2d at 703.
Furthermore, any deficiency must be
prejudicial to defendant. It is not enough
to claim that the alleged errors had some
conceivable effect on the outcome or could
have had a prejudicial effect on the fact
finders. To be found sufficiently
prejudicial, defendant must affirmatively
show that a "reasonable probability" exists
that, but for counsel's error, the result
would have been different. We have defined
"reasonable probability" as that sufficient
to undermine confidence in the reliability of
the verdict.
723 P.2d at 405 (footnote citation omitted).

Defendant fails to

satisfy this two-pronged standard on either of his
ineffectiveness claims.
In his motion for a new trial and the hearing on that
motion before the trial court, defendant neither alleged
ineffective assistance based on counsel's failure to move to
suppress certain evidence nor presented any evidence in support
of that claim (R. 122-23, 1084-1150).

A review of defendant's

appellate argument on this point (Br. of App. at 15-19) indicates
that it is based almost entirely on speculation about when
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certain physical evidence was obtained by the investigating
officers and the extent to which evidence obtained at different
times provided the basis for the officers1 conclusion that the
fires were the result of arson.

Consequently, defendant is

unable to present any cogent argument that trial counsel should
have known that certain evidence was inadmissible under Michigan
3Li Tylerr 436 U.S. 499 (1978), or Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S.
287 (1984), and was therefore obliged to file a motion to

suppress.

£££, e g . , United States v. Wheeler* 800 F.2d 100, 106

(7th Cir. 1986); Lockhart v. McCotter. 782 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir.
1986).

In addition to his failure to develop the facts necessary

to demonstrate that critical evidence was obviously excludable
under those two cases, defendant makes no effort to show that the
evidence would have been suppressed under Utah R. Crim. P. 12(g)
(UTAH CODE ANN. S 77-35-12(g) (1982)), the controlling rule for
motions to suppress brought under the fourth amendment or article
I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution.

That rule provides that

evidence will not be suppressed unless it is established that the
violation is "both substantial and not committed in good faith."

Sfi£ Aififi United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (good faith
exception to the fourth amendment exclusionary rule established
in warrant context); Illinois v. Krull.

U.S.

, 107 S.Ct.

1160 (1987) (exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence
obtained as a result of warrantless search conducted pursuant to
reasonable reliance on unconstitutional statute); United States
v. Williams. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980),fifiJLt.denied. 449 U.S.
1127 (1981) (good faith exception to exclusionary rule adopted in
warrantless context).
-8-

Although it may in some instances constitute grounds
for reversal of a conviction, counsel's failure to file a fourth
amendment suppression motion is not £££ £& ineffective assistance

of counsel.

Kimmelman v> MorrisQiif

2574f 2588 (1986).

U.S.

,

, 106 S.Ct.

Because counsel's competence is presumed, the

defendant bears the burden of rebutting this presumption by
proving that his attorney's representation was unreasonable under
prevailing professional norms. UkicL.
this burden.

Defendant has not carried

For example, there is no showing that a suppression

motion probably would have succeeded and no evidence that counsel
was guilty of the egregious failure to pursue discovery of the
prosecution's evidence that the attorney in Kimmelman was.
Indeed, contrary to the situation in Kimmelman, where deficient
performance was found, defendant's counsel conducted extensive
discovery and called numerous defense witnesses.
Furthermore, defendant fails to demonstrate the
requisite prejudice suffered by this alleged deficiency in
counsel's performance.

His only specific reference to allegedly

inadmissible evidence is to pictures taken three days after the
fire by Captain Memmott.

Br. of App. at 16.

His vague

references to "some evidence" seized by Memmott or other
investigators, id., at 16, 19, as being inadmissible are
meaningless.

Defendant simply does not offer any substantial

basis for concluding that it is reasonably probable that
exclusion of the challenged photographs and other unidentified
evidence (which defendant alleges was not excluded due to
counsel's error) would have produced a different result in his
trial.
-9-

Defendant's alternate claim of ineffectiveness fares
little better.

Without even identifying any of his prior

convictions, defendant argues that counsel was legally
ineffective when he advised him not to testify at trial (even
though defendant wished to) because the prosecution would likely
cross-examine him on those convictions for impeachment purposes.
At the hearing on defendant's motion for a new trial, defendant's
trial counsel testified that, when he gave defendant the advice,
he was not aware of the applicable rule of evidence —Utah R.
Evid. 609.2

However, as in the lower court, defendant presents

no persuasive argument that his prior convictions were plainly
inadmissible under Rule 609, thereby rendering counsel's
pertormance deficient.
1

Indeed, because of the absence of any

Rule 609 provides in pertinent part:

(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the
credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of
a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by
public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1)
was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year
under the law under which he was convicted, and the court
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2)
involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the
punishment.
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is
not admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed
since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness
from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is
the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of
justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by
specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its
prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a conviction more than
ten years old as calculated herein, is not admissible unless the
proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written
notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse
party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such
evidence.
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references to prior convictions or any legal analysis of the
admissibility question, this Court should decline to address
defendant's ineffectiveness claim.

See State v. Amicone. 689

P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) ("Since the defendant fails to
support [her] argument by any legal analysis or authority, we
decline to rule on it.")j State v. One 1982 Silver Honda. 55 Utah
Adv. Rep. 46, 48 n. 4,

P.2d.

,

n. 4 (1987).

Even if the

Court were to address the issue, it is at least an open question
whether defendant's convictions for burglary and theft,^ for
example, could have been brought out on cross-examination under
Rule 609(a)(2).

As noted by the trial court, federal case law

and at least one Utah case strongly suggest that burglary and
theft are crimes involving dishonesty for purposes of Rule
609(a)(2) (R. 1142-47).

See State v. Cintron. 680 P.2d 33, 34

(Utah 1984) (theft is crime involving dishonesty under former
Utah R. Evid. 21 (a rule similar to Rule 609(a)(2)); Annot.. 39
ALR Fed. 570, 596-99 (1978 & Supp. 1986).4
717 P.2d 1325, 1334-35 (Utah 1986).

Cf. State v. Banner.

Moreover, defendant's

convictions for those felonies might well have been admissible
under Rule 609(a)(1).

Banner. 717 P.2d at 1334. Thus, one

•> Defendant was convicted of burglary and theft in 1973 and
released from incarceration for those offenses in 1978 (R. 113940). Therefore, subsection (b) of Rule 609 does not apply.
The Utah Supreme Court has never construed Rule 609(a)(2);
however, it has made clear that, in accordance with the intent of
the advisory committee for Utah's new rules of evidence, it will
•lookM to the interpretations of the federal rules by the
federal courts to aid in interpreting the Utah rules." State v.
Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1333-34 (Utah 1986) (citing State v. Gray,
717 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986)).
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cannot fairly conclude that counsel's advice to defendant was
clearly erroneous, or that the deficient performance prong of the
ineffectiveness test has been satisfied.
Finally, defendant does not disclose what his testimony
would have been had he taken the stand or how it may have
affected the outcome of his trial.

During the hearing on

defendant's motion for a new trial, defendant's trial counsel
acknowledged that defendant's anticipated testimony would only
have been corroborative of testimony given by other defense
witnesses (R. 1118-20)•

Under these circumstances, defendant has

not shown any actual prejudice suffered because of counsel's
allegedly deficient performance, and thus is unable to satisfy
the second prong of the ineffectiveness test.

As noted in Laom

v. State, 284 Ark. 426, 682 S.W.2d 755 (1985):
IA] petitioner must do more than simply state
that he was not allowed to testify. He must
state specifically what the content of his
testimony would have been and demonstrate
that his failure to testify resulted in
actual prejudice to his defense. To
reiterate, there can be no finding of
ineffective assistance of counsel without a
showing of prejudice sufficient to undermine
the proper functioning of the judicial

process.
682 S.W.2d at 758.

stricKland v» Washington»
£££. jal&fi State v. Johnson. 719 P.2d 771

(Mont. 1986); State v. Carriger. 143 Ariz. 142, 692 P.2d 991,
1004 (1984), ££JtJt. denied. 471 U.S. 1111 (1985).

Insofar as

United States v. Butts. 630 F.Supp. 1145 (D. Me. 1986), a case
relied on by defendant, stands for the proposition that the
prejudice required for an ineffectiveness claim is presumed from
the deprivation of a defendant's right to testify, it appears to
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be inconsistent with the Strickland standard adopted by the Utah
Supreme Court*
In sum, defendant fails to demonstrate that he was
denied effective assistance of counsel.

To the contrary, the

record indicates that defendant, on the whole, received excellent
representation from counsel, who conducted extensive pretrial
investigation, thoroughly cross-examined the prosecution's
witnesses, and presented numerous witnesses in defendant's
behalf.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, defendant's
//L~—

conviction should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

O ^ d a y of May, 19 87.

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

DAVID B. THOMPSON
ft
Assistant Attorney General
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